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Abstract. We examine the reason that there have coexisted the two opposing
views on distressed banks’ lending behavior in Japan’s post-bubble period: the one
is the stagnant lending in a capital crunch and the other is the forbearance lending
to low-quality borrowers. To this end, we address the measurement problem for
bank balance sheet risk. We identify the credit supply and allocation eﬀects of bank
capital in the bank loan equation speciﬁed at loan level, thereby ﬁnding that the
“parallel worlds”, or the two opposing views, emerge because the regulatory capital
does not reﬂect the actual condition of increased risk on bank balance sheet, while
the market value of capital does. By uncovering banks’ engagement in patching-up of
the regulatory capital in the Japan’s post-bubble period, we show that lowly market
capitalized banks that had diﬃculty in building up adequate equity capital for their
risk exposure decreased the overall supply of credits. The parallels world can emerge
whenever banks are allowed to overvalue assets with their discretion, as in Japan’
post-bubble period.
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1. Introduction Among ﬁnancial crises in developed economies, the one in Japan af-
ter the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s was unprecedented in terms of
the length and depth of the subsequent economic downturn.1 Debates about the rea-
sons for Japan’s prolonged stagnation have been raised accordingly (e.g., Motonishi and
Yoshikawa (1999), Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and Hoshi and Kashyap (2004)), and the
issue concerning the lending behavior of banks with impaired capitals has been one of the
most plausible explanations, as the post-bubble period saw the malfunction of the banking
system.
When a severely adverse shock hits the economy and many borrowers become insolvent,
theoretically banks should face impaired capitals, irrespective of whether the bank capitals
are evaluated for the regulatory or market values. Theoretical literature predicts two-types
of lending behaviors of such impaired banks: one is stagnant lending in a capital crunch,
and the other is forbearance lending. In the former type of lending, impaired banks that
are subject to capital constraints decrease credits to borrowers, whether they are good or
bad borrowers.2 On the other hand, in the latter type, the impaired banks conduct a
window dressing to avoid the realization of capital losses and thus allocate more credits
to insolvent borrowers, while hoping that they will improve.3 These two practices have
diﬀerent theoretical backgrounds, but they have often been accused of being the source of
the prolonged stagnation experienced since the 1990s in Japan: the stagnant bank lending
is well known in Japanese as kashishiburi, while the forbearance lending as oigashi.
The two opposing views to explain lending practices of impaired banks share the premise
that the impaired banks worried much about the further deterioration of their balance sheet,
but these opposing views sharply diﬀer in explaining impaired bank’s lending behavior: the
stagnant lending in a capital crunch involves the issue of overall credit undersupply to all
borrowers, while the forbearance lending involves the issue of credit allocation to low-quality
1 See e.g., Hoshi (2001) for Japan’s bubble economy and its collapse in the early 1990s.
2 Bernanke and Lown (1991) deﬁne a credit crunch as “a signiﬁcant leftward shift in the supply curve
for loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers”, and
relate a credit crunch to a capital crunch, providing evidence on the US economic crisis in the early 1990s.
The theoretical literature on a capital crunch includes Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), Calomiris and Wilson
(2004), and Diamond and Rajan (2011).
3 The theoretical literature about the forbearance lending includes Diamond (2001), Caballero et al.
(2008), and Bruche and Llobet (2014).
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borrowers. However, somehow, empirical literature has provided the mixed evidence sup-
porting the two opposing views on the lending behavior of Japanese distressed banks in the
post-bubble period, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005), Gan (2007), and Watanabe (2007).
In this paper, we explore the reason that such a parallel world of distressed bank’s lend-
ing behavior emerged in empirical investigations, particularly focusing on a misperception
problem for bank balance sheet (bank default) risk.
Models of banking under asymmetric information have emphasized the potential conﬂict
of interest between banks and depositors (see, e.g., Diamond (1984) and Calomiris and
Wilson (2004)). This information problem faced by banks encourages them to oﬀer short-
term (demandable) low-risk debt, concentrating most balance sheet risk in their capital and
thus insulating depositors from the balance sheet risk. Therefore, it really matters that
one can precisely grasp whether banks are well capitalized to absorb their balance sheet
risk and stabilize banking system. In the post-bubble period of Japan, the misperception
problem for bank balance sheet risk came in tandem with the introduction of regulatory
capital standards, though they were introduced to prevent an overall undersupply of credit
in a capital crunch or prevent excessive risk taking by impaired banks in the forbearance
lending.
Figure 1 shows the bank market capital ratio and regulatory capital surplus in the
post-bubble period of Japan. We can observe that the regulatory capital ratio continued
to increase during the 1990s, while the market value of bank capital continued to decrease.
This indicates that Japanese banks window-dressed the regulatory capital ratio, albeit
facing substantive increases in their default risk measured by the market value. Indeed,
the correlation of the two capital measures is −0.83 and hence they have a seemingly
contradicting information on bank capital deﬁcits. The post-bubble period in Japan saw
the considerable divergence of the regulatory capital from its market value; thus it provides
a good natural experiment which allows us to investigate whether or how such divergence
between the bank regulatory and market capital aﬀects our understanding of prevailing
patterns of lending behavior of troubled banks. In particular, we address the coexistence
problem for the two opposing views on the lending behavior of Japanese distressed banks
in terms of the misperception problem for bank balance sheet risk, thereby demonstrating
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that the use of the regulatory capital as a measure of bank balance sheet risk would lead
to erroneous assessment of bank lending behavior.
Our study for the misperception of bank balance sheet risk and lending behavior fully
shares the awareness of recent empirical studies on the misperception problem for bank
balance sheet risk before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Haldane (2014) and Bulow
and Klemperer (2015) pointed out that regulatory measures of bank capital have not had
predictive power for bank failures. Indeed, the regulatory measures of Bears Sterns, Wa-
chovia, Washigton Mutual, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac were all seen by regulators as
well capitalized immediately before their failures. Haldane and Madouros (2012) and Sarin
and Summers (2016) attempted to measure bank risk through market measures, thereby
demonstrating that in a horse race among regulatory measures (e.g., the Basel III Tier I
ratio) and market measures (e.g., credit default swaps, and price-earnings ratios), the mar-
ket capital ratio (the market value of equity relative to total assets) has most explanatory
power in predicting bank failure. In addition, the market capital ratio of US major banks
has declined not only in the precrisis period, but also in the current period (Sarin and
Summers (2016)). These studies focused on the misperception problem for bank balance
sheet risk. However, our study develop this issue by addressing the possibility that such
misperception problem would cause erroneous assessment of bank lending behavior and
would lead to the coexistence of the two opposing views about it, as in the late 1990s in
Japan. Because the late 1990s in Japan is also the pre-banking crisis period as well as the
post-bubble period, our analysis of this period would give a rich insight into the arrival of
the banking crisis.
In this paper, to address the coexistence problem, we inspect a loan-level matched
dataset of Japanese banks and their listed borrowers in the post-bubble period of the late
1990s, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007). This is partially because loan-
level data enable us to overcome the identiﬁcation problem in terms of the controllability
of demand factors in specifying the bank loan equation, and partially because testing the
forbearance lending by lowly capitalized banks to their low-quality borrowers requires the
inclusion of a ﬁrm performance variable in the bank loan equation. Loan-level data are
superior to bank- and ﬁrm- level panel data in data structure to overcome the omitted-
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variable problem due to the weakness in controlling for borrower-side factors in the bank
loan equation (see Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jime´nez et al. (2012; 2014)).
Our analytical focus is on the eﬀect of changes in bank capital (the regulatory capital
or the market capital) BCAPit on the “allocation” of bank credits ΔLOAN
j
it among good
and bad borrowers as well as on the “supply” of credits to those borrowers. The nov-
elty of our analysis is that we strictly deﬁne the credit supply and the allocation eﬀect
as the ﬁrst and the second derivative eﬀect in the bank loan equation speciﬁed at loan
level. More concretely, the credit supply eﬀect of bank capital involves the ﬁrst derivative
∂ΔLOANjit/∂ BCAPit in the bank loan equation, where previous researches ﬁnd the exis-
tence of a capital crunch mainly focused on, irrespective of whether it used loan-level (Gan
(2007)), or bank-level data (Watanabe (2007)). On the other hand, the credit allocation ef-
fect involves a coeﬃcient parameter on an interaction term consisting of bank capital ratios
and a ﬁrm performance variable FIRMjt , or the second derivative ∂
2ΔLOANjit/∂ FIRM
j
t ∂ BCAPit,
which Peek and Rosengren (2005) focused on to build the evidence that the forbearance
lending prevailed in the Japan’s post-bubble period using loan-level matched data.
If the ﬁrst derivative has a positive value, it implies that a capital crunch, or the stagnant
lending by lowly capitalized banks, prevailed in the post-bubble period, or the pre-crisis
period, of the late 1990s. Conversely, if the ﬁrst derivative has a negative value for low-
quality borrowers and the second derivative has positive one (when a ﬁrm performance
variable is deﬁned so that its value become larger as the ﬁrm has better performance), the
credit misallocation of lowly capitalized bank to low-quality borrowers prevailed. We focus
on the sign of the two derivatives, especially considering whether or how the divergence of
the regulatory capital from its market value produces the two opposing views on distressed
banks’ lending behavior.
We ﬁnd that the use of the regulatory capital as a proxy of the bank balance sheet
risk provides evidence supporting the forbearance lending in which lowly capitalized banks
did not increase nor decrease credits, but the credits were allocated more to low-quality
borrowers in the post-bubble period, as demonstrated by Peek and Rosengren (2005); that
is, the regulatory capital produces an insigniﬁcant and a signiﬁcantly positive estimate
for the ﬁrst and the second derivative, respectively. This result is observed only in the
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bank group with a higher level of the regulatory capital buﬀer, and accordingly, it is quite
consistent with the hypothesis of Peek and Rosengren (2005) that Japanese banks engaged
in window-dressing and patching-up of the regulatory or the bank capital ratio. Conversely,
the use of the market value of bank capital provides evidence on the existence of a capital
crunch in which lowly market capitalized banks decreased credits to all borrowers even if
they were good borrowers, as demonstrated by Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007), that is,
the market capital produces a signiﬁcantly positive and an insigniﬁcant estimate for the
ﬁrst and the second derivative. In contrast to the result for the regulatory capital measure,
this result for the market measure is not qualitatively diﬀerent among all the bank groups
of lower, middle and higher levels of the market capital ratio, but quantitatively diﬀerent
so that equity capital constraints in lending are more pronounced for banks in the lower
market capital group. The above ﬁndings are robust even if we employ the same type
of nonlinear speciﬁcation of Peek and Rosengren (2005) and we also use bank’s lending
exposure to real estates in the bubble period in stead of the market capital measure, as in
Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007).
Given the above ﬁndings, we uncover “the real world”, or the true lending behavior
of Japanese banks in the post-bubble (pre-banking crisis) period of the late 1990s. By
simultaneously controlling for the two bank capital measures and their interaction eﬀects
in the bank loan model, we ﬁnd that the supply and allocation eﬀects (the ﬁrst and second
derivative eﬀects) of the regulatory capital ratio completely vanish, but only the supply
eﬀect of the market capital ratio survives; that is, in reality, the stagnant lending due to
a capital crunch prevailed, and not the forbearance lending. This result is robust, not
depending on the use of some ﬁrm performance variables.
Why does only the eﬀect of the market capital ratio survive, but not that of the regu-
latory capital ratio? To address this question, we run the cross-sectional regression for the
bank capital structure, which is based on the standard corporate ﬁnance theory emphasiz-
ing “normal market forces”: creditors require banks’ capital building to secure a valuable
charter or demand more equity protection from banks with more business uncertainty (see
Flannery and Rangan (2008), Gropp and Heider (2010), Valencia (2016), and Corbae et al.
(2017)). Through this capital structure regression, we ﬁnd that the market capital ratio
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is determined by standard corporate ﬁnance variables, but the regulatory capital ratio is
not at all. This result is robust, not depending on the levels of the two capital measures,
though only the market capital ratio of banks with lower market capital levels—banks
facing a more severe capital crunch—is less sensitive to two determinants: proﬁtability
and asset volatility. Such insensitivity implies that lowly market capitalized banks have
diﬃculty to build up the market capital ratio in accordance with their proﬁtability and
uncertainty through issuing equity. Our ﬁndings from the capital structure regression sug-
gest that in explaining bank lending behavior in relation to the capital structure, it would
matter how the capital structure is determined. Without investigating it, we cannot iden-
tify the background mechanism, through which the capital structure aﬀects banks’ lending
behavior.
Given this insight, a key driver of a capital crunch due to insuﬃcient market capitaliza-
tion would be the standard corporate ﬁnance determinants for the bank capital structure.
Considering that banks with lower levels of the market capital ratio have more diﬃculty to
build up suﬃcient equity capital, compared to their proﬁtability and business uncertainty,
we have the legitimate expectation that the inclusion both or either of the two determi-
nants for the bank capital structure into the model would eliminate the signiﬁcance of the
market capital ratio in the bank loan equation. To examine this conjecture, we include,
additionally, each of the determinants for the bank capital structure into the bank loan
equation. Thus, we ﬁnd that only the bank’s business uncertainty, or the bank’s portfolio
risk, eliminates the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio. This implies that a key driver
of a capital crunch would be rooted in lowly market capitalized banks’ diﬃculty of building
up appropriate level of equity capital for risks of their assets. This ﬁnding provides an
rich insight into a background mechanism of a capital crunch: when they try to increase
risk exposure and take more risk, if banks cannot build the market value of capital enough
to absorb the risk, they will face equity capital constraints in lending. In addition, this
tendency of a capital crunch is more noticeable for banks with lower market values of
capital.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature on distressed
banks’ lending behavior and ﬁnancial background in Japan, and then discusses the measure-
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ment problem for bank balance sheet risk. Section 3 presents an empirical speciﬁcation and
explains our dataset. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical analysis and then shows
that the parallel worlds, or the two views on troubled bank’s lending behavior, would emerge
depending on which of the regulatory capital and the market capital is used as the proxy
for bank balance sheet risk. Section 5 uncovers lending behavior by Japanese distressed
banks through simultaneously controlling for the two capital measures and the interaction
of them. In this section, we also explore the reason why the parallel worlds would emerge
by investigating determinants of the two capital measures. Section 6 explores a key driver
of the capital crunch among the determinants of the bank capital structure, thereby pro-
viding an insight for a background mechanism of the lending by troubled banks. Section 7
oﬀers conclusions.
2. Bank Balance Sheet Risk and Lending Behavior In this section, we review
literature on distressed banks’ lending behavior and ﬁnancial background in Japan, and
then discuss the measurement problem for bank balance sheet risk in assessing those lending
behavior.
2.1. Literature on Lending by Troubled Japanese Banks Here, we brieﬂy review
previous researches on the lending behavior of troubled Japanese banks, particularly fo-
cusing on what measures they used as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk or bank default
risk. As discussed below, we place high priority on the three studies of Peek and Rosengren
(2005), Gan (2007), and Watanabe (2007), partially because they allow us to highlight the
measurement problem for bank balance sheet risk in analyzing distressed banks’ lending
behavior, and partially because like ours, the former two studies used loan-level matched
data, though each provided two opposing views on distressed banks’ lending behavior in
the post-bubble (pre-banking crisis) period of Japan.
One strand of empirical researches on Japan’s lending by distressed banks involves
examining a capital crunch, or a debt overhang, in the post-bubble period of the 1990s.4
These recent studies include Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007). The two studies used each
4 See Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren (1995; 2000), Berrospide and Edge (2010), and
Carlson et al. (2013) for empirical researches on a capital crunch in the United States.
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bank’s lending exposure to the real estate industry in the real-estate bubble of the late
1980s as a proxy of the bank balance sheet risk in the post-bubble period. Watanabe
(2007) used bank-level panel data from 1995 to 2000 and used the lending exposure to the
real estate industry as the instrument variable of the regulatory capital ratio, thus providing
the evidence that a capital crunch existed in the late 1990s.5 Like us, Gan (2007) used
loan-level matched data from 1994 to 1998, and thus demonstrated that lending by banks
with greater real estate exposures in the late 1980s decreased more credits to borrowers
due to a capital crunch of the late 1990s.
In contrast to the above studies supporting the existence of a capital crunch, Peek and
Rosengren (2005) showed that banks’ window-dressing motives to avoid the realization of
losses on their balance sheet provided additional credit to low-quality ﬁrms in the post-
bubble period. Like ours, they used loan-level matched data from 1994 to 1999, and
included the regulatory capital ratio as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk in their bank
loan equation. In terms of the implementation of prudential policy, Giannettie and Simonov
(2013) examined the eﬀects of Japan’s three public capital injections in 1998, 1999 and 2003
on capital-injected banks’ lending behavior using loan-level data from 1998 to 2004. They
demonstrated that if capital injected banks were still undercapitalized, those banks were
more likely to lend to low-quality borrowers, using the regulatory capital ratio as a proxy
of the bank balance sheet risk.6
5 Using a bank-level panel dataset, Ito and Sasaki (2002) estimated a bank loan equation in Japan
from 1990 to 1993, as did Woo (2003) from 1991 to 1997, Ogawa (2003, Chapter 2) from 1992 to 1999,
Montgomery (2005) from 1982 to 1999, and Hosono (2006) from 1975 to 1999. They all found that a
decrease in the regulatory capital ratio caused a decrease in bank loans in the 1990s by including the
regulatory capital ratio into their bank loan equations. However, unlike Watanabe (2007) and Gan (2007),
they all did not use an instrumental variable for the regulatory capital ratio such as the lending exposure
to the real estate industry in the late 1980s; hence, their empirical results appear to be less robust and
depend on sample periods to be used for their analyses.
6 Unlike these two studies, Sekine et al. (2003) used ﬁrm-level panel data from 1986 to 1999, while
Watanabe (2010) used bank-level panel data from 1995 to 2000 and then included bank’s book capital
ratio as a proxy of its balance sheet risk in his bank loan equation. The former found that highly-indebted
ﬁrms belonging to nonmanufacturing industries increased bank borrowings after 1993, albeit their low
proﬁtability, and the latter demonstrated that tough regulatory stance which urged banks to write oﬀ
nonperforming loans produced a large loss of bank capital and such a loss of capital would induce bank
lending to shift to low-quality borrowers. Caballero et al. (2008) addressed a more speciﬁc issue of the
misallocation of bank credit toward low-quality borrowers as “zombie lending” (see also Hoshi (2006)).
They used ﬁrm-level panel data form 1981 to 2002, thereby demonstrating that the increase in the number
of zombie ﬁrms would suppress the investment and employment growth of non-zombies.
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As reviewed above, previous researches have focused on Japan’s bank lending behavior
mainly in the late 1990s, and have provided the mixed evidence of the stagnant and the
forbearance lending for the lending behavior of distressed banks. Through this paper, we
hypothesize that such coexistence of the two opposing views would be ascribed to the
diﬀerence in the choice of a proxy for bank balance sheet risk used to assess the lending
behavior of troubled banks. The researches suggesting the existence of a capital crunch
use banks’ lending exposures to the real estate in the real-estate bubble of the late 1980s
as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk in the post-bubble period, as in Gan (2007) and
Watanabe (2007), while those suggesting the existence of the forbearance lending used the
regulatory capital ratio, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005). One of possible reasons for
such a measurement problem of the bank balance sheet risk in Japan is banks’ behavior
under the regulatory policy implemented after the introduction of the regulatory capital
standards. In the next subsection, we review this problem in the context of Japan’s bank
regulatory policy.
2.2. Misperception Problem for Bank Balance Sheet Risk In the post-bubble
period of Japan, or the pre-banking criss period, of the late 1990s, the measurement problem
for bank balance sheet risk came in tandem with the introduction of the regulatory capital
standard, although they are originally aimed at preventing the stagnant lending in a capital
crunch or excessive risk taking by impaired banks in the forbearance lending.
In 1988, bank regulators in major industrial countries agreed to standardize capital
requirements internationally, through the so-called Basel Accord. Subsequent to this, all
Japanese banks struggled to meet these capital standards in the 1990s. During this period
in Japan, land and stock prices fell continuously. Consequently, many loans granted during
the bubble period of the late 1980s became nonperforming. Accordingly, banks that were
more impaired and had less capital issued additional subordinated debt to inﬂate their
bank capital. They were able to do so because, within the local Japanese rule governing
capital requirements, subordinated debt can be counted as Tier II capital (see, e.g., Ito and
Sasaki (2002) and Montgomery (2005)). Japanese banks also used deferred tax assets to
compensate for capital losses arising from unrealized losses on their holding stocks. This
is because the government allowed banks to include their deferred tax assets into Tier I
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capital in 1998. Bank managers at their discretion estimated subjectively the total amount
of deferred tax assets (see Skinner (2008)).
In the 1990s, these regulatory forbearance policies had caused Japanese banks to engage
in a “patching up” of their regulatory (that is, book) capital ratios (see, e.g., Shrieves and
Dahl (2003)). In the late 1990s, the attitude of the Japanese government and regulatory
authorities toward Japanese banks started to change by allowing them to enter bankruptcy
and by conducting capital injections. In evidence, in 1998 and 1999, the government of
Japan decided to infuse a large amount of capital into poorly capitalized banks in order to
increase their capital adequacy ratios. These large-scale public capital injections allowed
almost all Japanese banks to meet their capital standards (see, e.g., Watanabe (2007) and
Nakashima (2016) for the Japanese bank recapitalization programs). However, the amount
of nonperforming loans in Japanese banks only started to decrease after the Financial Revi-
talization Program, or the so-called Takenaka Plan, was executed in 2002 (see Sakuragawa
and Watanabe (2009) for details).
Figure 1 shows the bank market capital ratio, which is deﬁned by dividing the market
value of bank’s equities by its total book assets, and the regulatory capital surplus—deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between bank’s reported capital adequacy ratio and its regulatory target
ratio, i.e. 8% for international banks and 4% for domestic banks—in the post-bubble period
of Japan. As shown in this ﬁgure, the regulatory capital ratio continued to increase during
the 1990s because of the Japan’s regulatory forbearance policies, while the market capital
ratio continued to decrease because equity market participants considered that Japanese
banks conducted window-dressing of their regulatory capital by overvaluing their capital
and undervaluing their nonperforming loans (see Fukao [2003] and Hoshi and Kashyap
[2004; 2010]). In fact, the correlation coeﬃcient of the two variables is −0.83 at the
aggregate level. This tendency that the market value of capital and the regulatory capital
diverge from each other, reﬂecting diﬀerent information on banks’ risk proﬁles, is also
clearly observed in Figure 2, where the two variables appear to be negatively correlated in
the post-bubble period.
This tendency is also observed in the relation between banks’ lending exposure to the
real estate industry in the real-estate bubble of 1989 and the regulatory capital. The
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left panel on Figure 3 shows that the regulatory capital has little or no correlation with
the bank lending exposure to the real estate industry, with the correlation coeﬃcient of
0.06. On the other hand, as shown in the right panel on Figure 3, the market value of
capital and the bank lending exposure to the real estate industry are negatively correlated
with the correlation coeﬃcient of −0.46, indicating that bank market capital ratio reﬂects
information on the bank lending exposure to the real estate industry in the real-estate
bubble period. Given the decline in real estate prices in 1990s caused a deterioration of
the bank capital, the negative correlation indicates that the market value of the bank
capital are likely to capture the soundness of bank capital more correctly (see Gan [2007])
and Watanabe [2007]). In Subsection 5.2, to tackle the issue of why and how the two
capital measures produce the two opposing views of troubled banks’ lending behavior, we
will examine determinants of the two measures in terms of the standard corporate ﬁnance
theory emphasizing market forces.
Given that large Japanese banks received the capital injection programs around 2000,
when the banking crisis occurred, the above discussion provides an insight on the mea-
surement problem for bank balance sheet risk; that is, the market value of bank capital
(or the bank lending exposure to the real estate industry) can capture bank default risk in
the post-bubble period of the 1990s, while the regulatory capital cannot capture it because
troubled Japanese banks were allowed to overvalue their portfolios with their partial discre-
tion under the framework of the Basel Accords. As discussed in Introduction, this insight
shares the ﬁnding of previous studies for the misperception problem for bank balance sheet
(or bank default) risk before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (Haldane and Madouros
[2012] and Sarin and Summers [2016]), which demonstrated that the market capital ratio
had outstandingly explanatory power in predicting bank failure before the crisis, but the
regulatory capital ratio did not at all.
With due consideration of such a misperception problem for bank balance sheet risk, we
can have the legitimate expectation that the conclusion of the lending behavior of distressed
banks heavily depends on which of the two measures is used as a proxy of bank balance
sheet risk. In the following, we will untangle this misperception problem for bank balance
sheet risk and its lending behavior through analyzing the bank loan equation.
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3. Empirical Speciﬁcation and Data In this section, we start by introducing an
empirical speciﬁcation for bank lending to examine the measurement problem for bank
balance sheet and bank lending behavior, and then discuss estimation method and our
dataset.
3.1. Speciﬁcation for Bank Loan Equations and Estimation Method As dis-
cussed in Introduction, we use a loan-level matched dataset of Japanese banks and their
listed borrowers to identify the eﬀect of bank capital on lending in Japan’s post-bubble pe-
riod, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007). The loan-level matched data allow
us not only to control for borrower-side factors through time*ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, but also
to analyze the credit allocation eﬀect through the interaction (second derivative) eﬀect of
bank capital and ﬁrm performance variables. To exploit these advantages of the loan-level
matched data, we specify the bank loan equation as follows:
ΔLOANjit = a0 + a1BCAPit−1 + a2BCAPit−1 ∗ FIRMjt−1 + vi + ujt + εjit, (1)
where the dependent variable, ΔLOANjit, indicates the growth rate of the total amount of
loans outstanding between bank i and domestic listed ﬁrm j at time t. vi denotes bank i’s
time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects to control for its time-invariant unobservables, while ujt denote
ﬁrm j’s time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects, or year ∗ uj with time dummies (year), to control for
borrowing ﬁrm’s total demand factors at each sample period t. εijt indicates the stochastic
disturbance term.
As for an observable explanatory variable, BCAPit denotes bank i’s ﬁnancial variable
that is considered to well capture the adequacy of bank capital and the increase in bank
default risk. More concretely, it includes either bank i’s market capital ratio or regulatory
capital surplus.7 FIRMjt includes ﬁrm j’s performance variable. In this paper, instead of
using conventional measures for proﬁtability such as the return on asset and the working
7 As discussed in Subsection 2.2, the bank market capital ratio is deﬁned by dividing market value of
the bank’s equity by its total book assets. We calculate the market value of equity by multiplying the
end-of-year stock price by the number of shares. The regulatory capital surplus is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between bank’s reported regulatory capital ratio and its regulatory target ratio (8% for international banks
and 4% for domestic banks).
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capital ratio, we use two equity-based measures of franchise values for ﬁrm’s business per-
formance in the future: Tobin’s q (FQjt ) and the distance to default (FDD
j
t). The reason is
that these equity-based measures would capture more ﬁrm’s current and future proﬁtabil-
ity than the conventional proﬁtability measures based on its past proﬁt. Considering that
banks tend to place more importance on borrower’s future performance when they evaluate
its default risk, the equity-based measures is more appropriate to examine their lending
behavior. Tobin’s q is deﬁned as the percentage ratio of the market value of ﬁrm i (VA)
to its book value, where the market value of the borrowing ﬁrm is deﬁned as the sum of
the market value of its equity (VE) and the book value of its total liabilities (D).
8 The
distance to default is deﬁned as
FDD =
{
ln (VA/D) +
(
r − 1
2
σ2A
)}
/σA, (2)
where r indicates the risk-free rate, and σA indicates the volatility of ﬁrm assets. The
distance-to-default can be interpreted as the expected standardized diﬀerence between the
market value of the ﬁrm and the book value of its liabilities. If the diﬀerence is small
(large), a ﬁrm is in danger of bankruptcy (healthy). A decrease (increase) in distance-
to-default implies greater (lesser) credit risk. We deﬁne the volatility of ﬁrm asset σA
as σA = σE × VE/VA. To estimate the volatility of equity (σE), we calculate the standard
deviation for the market value of equity for the ﬁnal month of a ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year and express
the estimated volatility as annual rates.9 We use the yield on one-year JGB as a proxy of
the risk-free rate (r). In this paper, we mainly focus on estimation results obtained using
Tobin’s q since it can easily classify borrowing ﬁrms as good or bad ones at the reference
value of 100: if Tobin’ q is not less than 100, the borrowing ﬁrm is categorized as a good
8 We calculate the market value of ﬁrm equity by multiplying the end-of-year stock price by the number
of shares. Firm book value is the book value of total assets.
9 More speciﬁcally, we calculate the annualized estimated volatility of the market value of equity as
follows:
σE,it =
√√√√√ 1
20− 1 ×
d(t)∑
k=d(t)−19
(
retk − retd(t)
)2 ×√240,
where d(t) denotes the last trading day of ﬁrm i’s ﬁscal year t, retk denotes the daily rate of change in
equity valuation, and retd(t) is the average rate of change in equity valuation during the previous 20 days.
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borrower, and otherwise, as bad one. The equation additionally includes a lending exposure
and a borrowing exposure as relationship variables. The lending exposure deﬁned as loans
from bank i to ﬁrm j divided by total loans of bank i. The borrowing exposure deﬁned, in
a same manner, as loans from bank i to ﬁrm j divided by total borrowings of ﬁrm j.
Note that to control for borrower-side factors in our bank loan equation with ujt, we
employ the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jime´nez et al.
(2012; 2014). The ﬁxed-eﬀects approach assumes that all potential borrower-side factors
are embodied in time-varying ﬁrm unobservables, which are captured by time*ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects (ujt).
10 This approach enables us not only to specify our lending equation in more
parsimonious way, as expressed in equation (1), but also to identify the eﬀect of bank capital
on lending more rigorously by controlling for demand factors in a more comprehensive way.
In the following analyses, as the benchmark model, we use equation (1) where borrower-side
factors are fully controlled with time*ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects .
On the other hand, by controlling for lender-side factors as well as borrower-side ones
with the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach through time*bank ﬁxed eﬀects, one can focus on the in-
teraction eﬀects and handle the issue concerning credit allocation in a more robust way.
More speciﬁcally, we introduce the following speciﬁcation for bank loans:
ΔLOANjit = a0 + a2BCAPit−1 ∗ FIRMjt−1 + vit + ujt + εjit, (3)
where we control for all potential lender-side factors by utilizing time-varying unobservables
vit. We also examine the interaction eﬀects, or the second derivative eﬀect, on credit
allocation using this double ﬁxed-eﬀect approach (see Jime´nez et al. (2014) and Nakashima
et al. (2017) for the double ﬁxed-eﬀect approach).11
Like ours, Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007) used the loan-level matched
10 Hosono and Miyakawa (2014), Nakashima (2016) employed this ﬁxed-eﬀect approach with Japanese
loan-level matched data. Hosono and Miyakawa (2014) identiﬁed the eﬀects of monetary policy on bank
loan supply through the bank balance sheet channel, while the latter examines the eﬀects of Japan’s public
capital injections on bank lending.
11 Jime´nez et al. (2014) and Nakashima et al. (2017) employed the double ﬁxed-eﬀect approach to
identify a risk taking channel of monetary policy in bank lending, which involves the issue of whether or
how monetary policy induces banks to change credit allocation from ﬁrms with lower credit risk to ones
with higher credit risk.
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data, but their way of specifying the bank loan equation are diﬀerent from ours. Peek
and Rosengren (2005) transformed growth data of bank loans into binary outcome data,
and then employed the random eﬀect Probit model. Our choice of a linear rather than
nonlinear model of bank lending is motivated by two reasons. First, nonlinear models
tend to produce biased estimates in panel data sets with many ﬁxed eﬀects, leading to an
incidental parameters problem and inconsistent estimates. Second, nonlinear ﬁxed eﬀects
models generate biased estimates for interaction eﬀects (see Ai and Norton (2003) for
details). Nonetheless, we also employ their nonlinear speciﬁcation, thereby attempting to
conduct a robustness check for estimation results based on our linear speciﬁcation. On
the other hand, like ours, Gan (2007) speciﬁed a lending equation in a linear regression
model, but unlike ours, did not control for bank’s unobservables, and control for ﬁrm’s
unobservables through time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects.12
Note that Peek and Rosengren (2005) included the regulatory capital surplus as a proxy
for bank balance sheet risk and focused on the interaction terms of this bank ﬁnancial
variable and ﬁrm performance variables. On the other hand, instead of using the bank
capital ratio, Gan (2007) included banks’ lending exposures to the real estate industry in
1989 in order to identify loan supply eﬀects of banks’ impaired capital. In contrast to the
two studies, Watanabe (2007) used a bank-level panel dataset and then used the lending
exposure to real estates as the instrument variable of the regulatory capital ratio, thus
providing the evidence that a capital crunch existed in the late 1990s. In Section 4, we also
test these speciﬁcations for robustness check.
The advantage of our loan-level analysis based on equations (1) and (2) is that we can
identify the credit supply and the allocation eﬀect as the ﬁrst and the second derivative
eﬀect. In these speciﬁcations, the ﬁrst derivative, ∂ΔLOANjit/∂ BCAPit−1 = a1+a2FIRM
j
t−1,
captures the eﬀect of bank capital changes on the credit supply, and the second deriva-
tive, ∂2ΔLOANjit/∂ FIRM
j
t ∂ CAPit = a2, implies the bank capital eﬀect on credit allocation
among better- and worse-performing ﬁrms. If the ﬁrst derivative has a positive value for all
values of the ﬁrm performance variable FIRMjt−1, it implies that a capital crunch prevails in
12 She employed the Heckman (1979)’s two-stage regression approach and in the ﬁrst-stage regression
and then calculated the inverse Mills ratio to control for the survivorship bias for bank-ﬁrm relationships
in the second-stage regression of her bank loan equation.
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a period of bank distress. On the other hand, if the ﬁrst derivative has a negative value for
low-quality ﬁrms (e.g. values with lower Tobin’s q) and the second derivative has a positive
value, the forbearance lending by lowly capitalized banks to low-quality ﬁrms prevails. We
examine whether or how the two bank capital measures produce the two opposing views on
distressed banks’ lending behavior by focusing on the ﬁrst and the second derivative eﬀect,
or the credit supply and the allocation eﬀect of bank capital.
Our bank loan equations (1) and (2) are speciﬁed in the framework of the three-way
ﬁxed-eﬀects linear regression model. To estimate our bank loan equation with the three-
way ﬁxed-eﬀects, we employ the estimation method developed by Abowd et al. (1999) and
Andrews et al. (2008). This estimation method gives consistent and unbiased parameter
estimates not only for time-varying observables, but also unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.2. Data Set The empirical analysis developed in this paper rests on a loan-level
dataset comprising a matched sample of Japanese banks and their borrowing ﬁrms listed
in Japan. We construct our loan-level data based on the Corporate Borrowings from
Financial Institutions Database compiled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc. This database
annually reports short- (a maturity of one year or less) and long-term (a maturity of
more than one year) loans from each ﬁnancial institution for every listed company on any
Japanese stock exchange.
The database includes some 120,000 observations, comprising more than 130 Japanese
banks, 2,000 listed borrowing ﬁrms, and 17,000 relationships for our sample period from
ﬁscal year (FY) 1992 to 1998, or the post-bubble period in Japan. The reason why we set up
our sample period beginning from FY 1992 is that a set of minimum capital requirements
for banks, known as Basel I, which was fully implemented at March 1993, or the end of
FY 1992, in Japan. The reason why we end our sample period at FY 1998, or March 1999,
is that important previous studies, such as Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007),
demonstrating the two opposing views—the stagnant lending in a capital crunch and the
forbearance lending—focused on the post-bubble period since the early 1990s which saw the
dysfunction of the Japanese banking system due to the severe deterioration of bank capital.
We combined the Nikkei database with the ﬁnancial statement data of the Japanese banks
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and their listed borrowing ﬁrms, also compiled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc.13
Our chief diﬃculty in working with the loan-level data was sorting through various
bank mergers and restructuring in our data. We recorded the date of all bankruptcies and
mergers that took place in the Japanese banking sector in our sample period. First, we
should not whenever a bank ceases to exist in our data because of a bankruptcy, ﬁrms cease
reporting that ﬁnancial institution as a source of loans. If ﬁrms cease reporting a bank as
a lender and we could not ﬁnd any information on a bankruptcy or a merger of the lending
bank, we ﬁlled in zero value as the outstanding mount of loans from the bank in our data.
On the other hand, if we ﬁnd evidence of a bankruptcy or merger of the bank and a ﬁrm
has the outstanding amount of loans from the restructured bank before that event and
from a surviving bank after that event, we calculate the growth rate of the loan from the
restructured bank by considering as if the restructured bank made both of the loans.14 In
order to calculate the loan growth of a restructured bank, we traced to it all banks that
predated it. Thus, if banks A and B merged in year t to form bank C, bank C’s loans in
year t − 1 is set equal to the sum of the loans for banks A and B, and the growth rate of
bank C’s loans in year t would be calculated accordingly.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for variables including the two bank capital variables
and the ﬁrm performance variables of Tobin’s q and the distance to default.
4. Emergence of Parallel World In this section, we report estimation results for the
two types of bank loan equations, each of which includes the regulatory capital ratio and
the market capital ratio. Thus, we show that the use of the two diﬀerent capital measures
produces the two opposing views, or the parallel worlds, for lending by troubled banks: the
stagnant lending by banks with equity capital constraints and the forbearance lending by
banks engaging in patching up of the regulatory capital.
13 The end of ﬁscal year for Japanese banks is March 31, but this is not necessarily the case for borrowing
ﬁrms. When combining the Nikkei database for loan-level data with the ﬁnancial statement data of banks
and their borrowing ﬁrms, we match bank-side information to borrower-side information in the same ﬁscal
year.
14 As for exits of some ﬁrms from our loan-level dataset in the middle of our full-sample period, we cannot
identify reasons for ﬁrm exit from our sample, including bankruptcy, management buyout, termination of
all the ﬁrm’s relationships, etc. Therefore, if a ﬁrm exits from the original data after year t, we drop an
observation for the ﬁrm from our dataset in year t. Thus, if the ﬁrm’s last observation in the original
dataset is in t, our adjusted sample includes the ﬁrm’s observations until year t− 1.
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4.1. Credit Supply and Allocation Eﬀects We start by reporting estimation results
of the supply eﬀect of bank capital on lending, or the ﬁrst derivative eﬀect deﬁned as
∂ΔLOANjit/∂ BCAPit−1 = a1+a2FIRM
j
t−1. Table 2 shows estimation results for the coeﬃcient
parameters, a1 and a2, and Figure 4 shows the average supply eﬀects for good and bad
borrowers where borrowing ﬁrms are classiﬁed into two groups as follows: if its Tobin’ Q is
not less than 100, the borrowing ﬁrm is labeled as a “good borrower”, and otherwise, it is
categorized as a “bad borrower”. As for the distance to default, a ﬁrm whose distance to
default is higher than the sample mean is categorized as a good borrower, and otherwise,
as a bad one.
As shown in this ﬁgure, the use of the regulatory capital ratio provides a negative
estimate for the average supply eﬀect of a bad borrower with the Tobin’s q being 50,
though insigniﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that the regulatory capital ratio produces signiﬁcantly
positive estimates for good borrowers with the Tobin’s q having values of 125 or more.
These results indicate that the decrease in the regulatory capital would increase credits
to low-quality borrowers, while decreasing credits to good borrowers during the Japan’s
post-bubble period. When using the distance to default, we have insigniﬁcant estimates
for ﬁrms facing higher default risk (whose distance to default are lower than two), but
signiﬁcantly positive estimates for ﬁrms facing relatively lower credit risk (whose distance
to default are higher than four).
On the other hand, the use of the market capital ratio produces signiﬁcantly positive
values for both good and bad borrowers. Furthermore, the result does not depend on which
of the Tobin’s q and the distance to default is included as a ﬁrm performance variable. This
implies that the decrease in the market capitalization would decrease credits to all borrowers
irrespective of borrows’ risk.
Table 2 also presents estimation results for the credit allocation eﬀect of bank capital,
or the second derivative eﬀect: ∂2ΔLOANjit/∂ FIRM
j
t−1 ∂ BCAPit−1 = a2. This table shows
the credit allocation eﬀects for the double ﬁxed eﬀect model (2) as well as the baseline
model (1).
We ﬁnd that the regulatory capital ratio has signiﬁcantly positive estimates in a robust
manner as both the baseline and the double ﬁxed eﬀect model produce positive estimates.
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This indicates that banks with lower regulatory capital would allocate more credits to
borrowers with the lower Tobin’s q or distance to default.
In contrast, the market capital ratio produces conﬂicting results; that is, the double
ﬁxed eﬀect model has an insigniﬁcant estimate, while the baseline model has signiﬁcantly
negative one. This tendency does not change whether we use the Tobin’q or the distance
to default as a ﬁrm variable. Given that the double ﬁxed eﬀect model can control for both
lender- and borrower-side factors more thoroughly, we should attach more importance to the
insigniﬁcant estimate based on this model. Hence, we infer that the use of the market capital
ratio would provide the evidence supporting the existence of a capital crunch, in which
banks with decrease in the equity capital would equally decrease credits to all borrowers
irrespective of borrowers’ risk.
The above results are based on the linear speciﬁcation, as expressed in equations (1) and
(2). Table 3 reports estimation results obtained by employing the nonlinear speciﬁcation
of Peek and Rosengren (2005) on the upper panel (A): the probit model with borrowing
ﬁrm’s random eﬀects.15 We can observe that even if we employ the nonlinear speciﬁcation,
our ﬁndings are robust: the use of the regulatory capital provides evidence supporting the
forbearance lending, while the use of the market value of bank capital provides evidence
on the existence of a capital crunch.
4.2. Lending Exposures to Real Estates in the Bubble Period As discussed in
Subsection 2.1, Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007) assume that bank lending exposures to the
real estate industry in the Japan’s bubble period has substantive information on Japanese
banks’ balance sheet risk in the post-bubble period. Table 3 also reports estimation results
obtained using the bank lending exposures to the real estate in 1989 in stead of the two
bank capital measures on the panel (B).16
Note that the estimation results based on the lending exposures to the real estate
industry are qualitatively same as those obtained using the market capital ratio; that is, it
produces signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant estimates for the credit supply (ﬁrst derivative) and
15 Note that Peek and Rosengren (2005) did not include lender-side unobservable covariates in their
nonlinear model. This may be because they treated only borrower-side mergers in their data construction.
16 In the speciﬁcation including the lending exposures to real estates in the late 1980s, we do not include
bank ﬁxed eﬀects since the bank exposure variable is not time-varying one.
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allocation (second derivative) eﬀects, respectively. This implies not only that banks with
larger exposures to the real estate industry in the bubble period were more likely to decrease
credits to all borrowers, but also that the market capital ratio also has similar information
on Japanese banks’ lending behavior in the post-bubble period as the exposure to the real
estate industry in the bubble period of the late 1980s. Given that the high exposure of
banks to the real estate industry is considered as a cause for deterioration of their balance
sheet in the post-bubble period and leads to Japan’s banking crisis in the late 1990s, the
market capital ratio appears a more appropriate indicator to capture the relation between
the condition of the bank capital and banks’ lending behavior.
4.3. Bank Lending with High, Middle and Low Capital Ratios The capital
crunch and the forbearance lending view involve the issue of how well or how less bank
capital is built up. To incorporate this issue into our analysis, we cluster our loan-level
sample into three subsamples for banks with high, middle and low capital ratios for each
of the two capital ratios. To construct the three subsamples, we deﬁnes banks belonging
to the ﬁrst tertile (above 34th percentile), the middle tertile (34-67th percentile) and the
bottom tertile (below 67th percentile) of all banks as high, middle and low capital banks,
respectively. Tables 4 and 5 show estimation results on the bank loan equations for banks
with the high, middle and low capital based on the market and regulatory capital ratio,
respectively.
In Table 4, we ﬁnd that estimated coeﬃcients on the market capital ratio are signiﬁ-
cantly positive for all the three levels of the market capital ratio, but the estimated value
(approximately two) for banks with the low level market capital are much larger than those
for banks with the high and middle market capital, each having almost same value (ap-
proximately one). Also note that these results do not depend on the choice of the ﬁrm
performance variables; the Tobin’s q and the distance to default.
As clearly shown in Table 5, estimation results for the regulatory capital ratio has quite
diﬀerent tendency from those for the market capital ratio: the interaction eﬀect, or the
credit allocation eﬀect, has signiﬁcantly positive estimates for banks with the high level of
the regulatory capital ratio. Also note that the results based on the subsample regression
for banks with the high regulatory capital ratio more sharply demonstrate the forbearance
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lending by those banks, compared with the results based on the full-sample regression. In
addition, the market capital ratio of those high regulatory capital banks is much smaller
than those of the two other bank groups in terms of the sample mean. These ﬁndings
indicate that banks more engaging in the window-dressing and the patching-up of the
regulatory capital provided more credits to a low-quality borrower while those banks were
facing low market values of equity capital.
4.4. Parallel Worlds of Japan’s Post-bubble Period Summing up our estimation
results for the post-bubble period of the late 1990s, the use of the market capital ratio and
the bank lending exposures to the real estate industry in 1989 provides the evidence sup-
porting the existence of a capital crunch, in which banks with impaired capital decreased
credits to ﬁrms irrespective of whether they were good or bad borrowers, as demonstrated
by Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007). The degree of capital constraints in bank lending is
especially higher for lower market capital banks, but the evidence for the capital crunch
is widely observed, without depending on levels of the market capital ratio. On the other
hand, the use of the regulatory capital ratio provides the evidence supporting the exis-
tence of the forbearance lending, in which impaired banks increased credits to low-quality
borrowers, allocating more credits to those ﬁrms, as demonstrated by Peek and Rosengren
(2005). In contrast to the case of the market capital constraints, regulatory capital con-
straints in the forbearance lending is observed only for higher regulatory capital banks,
which face lower market capital ratios. Also note that the above ﬁndings for the market
and the regulatory capital measures do not depend on whether we adopt linear or nonlinear
speciﬁcations. In the next section, we will explore the real world of lending by Japanese
distressed banks through simultaneously controlling for the two capital measures and the
interaction of them in the bank loan equation.
5. Uncovering the Real World In this section, we reveal the real world of distressed
bank’s lending behavior by controlling the interaction of the two capital measures, or the
source of the misperception of bank balance sheet risk, in the bank loan equation. Thus,
we answer which of the two opposing views—the stagnant lending by equity constrained
banks and the forbearance lending by banks with regulatory capital constraints—is more
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appropriate interpretation of the troubled bank’s lending behavior in Japan’s post-bubble
period. Moreover, we explore determinants of the regulatory and the market capital ratio
using cross-sectional regression for the bank capital structure based on the standard cor-
porate ﬁnance theory emphasizing market disciplines as as its determinants. By doing so,
we examine the reason that the parallel worlds of the two opposing views emerge.
5.1. Simultaneous Control of the Two Bank Capital Ratios In this subsection,
we simultaneously control for the market and the regulatory capital ratio and the interac-
tion of them, thereby examining which of the two capital measures has explanatory power
to explain bank lending behavior. As shown in Figure 1, and as pointed out by the re-
cent empirical studies of bank balance sheet risk (Haldane and Madouros (2012), Haldane
(2014), Bulow and Klemperer (2015) and Sarin and Summers (2016)), highly negative cor-
relations between the regulatory capital and the market value of equity capital are one
of the evidence of the misperception problem of measuring bank balance sheet risk based
on the regulatory capital ratio. Taking into account that such negative correlations would
aﬀect estimation results for bank loan equations and produce the two opposing views on
troubled banks’ lending behavior, we control for the source of misperception: the inter-
action of two capital measures. More concretely, we introduce the two interaction terms,
REGCAPit ∗MARKETCAPit and REGCAPit ∗MARKETCAPit ∗FIRMjt . The double interac-
tion term (REGCAPit ∗MARKETCAPit) and the triple term ( REGCAPit ∗MARKETCAPit ∗
FIRMjt ) are included to control for the interaction between the market capital and the reg-
ulatory capital ratio, and for the allocation eﬀect through the interaction of the two capital
measures, respectively. By including the two interaction terms into the bank loan equation
in order to investigate the source of misperception, we control for the interaction eﬀect of
the two capital measures and thus address distressed bank’s lending behavior in a more
comprehensive way.
Tables 6 and 7 show estimation results obtained by simultaneously controlling for the
two capital measures and the two interaction terms in bank loan equations (1) and (2).
Tables 8 and 9 report results based on the subsample regressions for the high, middle and
low levels of the market and the regulatory capital ratio. When using Tobin’s q as a ﬁrm
performance variable in Tables 6 and 8, we show that the simultaneous inclusion of the
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two capital measures provides signiﬁcant estimates for the two coeﬃcients. However, the
additional inclusion of the interaction terms eliminates the signiﬁcance of the regulatory
capital ratio. On the other hand, when using the distance to default as a ﬁrm variable
in Tables 7 and 9, we ﬁnd that the simultaneous inclusion of the two capital measures
eliminates the signiﬁcance of the regulatory capital ratio. Also note that these ﬁnding
that the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio remains signiﬁcant are robust as they do
not depend on the levels of the market and the regulatory capital ratio. Given that the
signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio survives in a robust manner, bank lending behavior
in Japan’s post-bubble period, or pre-banking crisis period, of the late 1990s should be
characterized as the stagnant lending by banks subject to equity capital constraints in a
capital crunch, instead of the forbearance lending.
5.2. Determinants of Market and Regulatory Capital Ratios In the previous
subsection, we demonstrated that the bank lending behavior in Japan’s post bubble period
would be characterized as a capital crunch in which banks with equity capital constraints
decreased credits to borrowers irrespective of borrowers’ risk. Here, we examine the reason
that the two bank capital measures moved in the opposite direction and the two opposing
views emerged. To this end, we analyze determinants of the market and the regulatory
capital ratio, following the empirical analyses of Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp
and Heider (2010). These studies attempt to identify determinants of bank capital struc-
tures by examining cross-sectional regressions. Their econometric speciﬁcation based on
the corporate ﬁnance theory are as follows:
BCAPit = α0 + α1BQit−1 + α2σit−1 + α3PROFit−1 + α4 ln SIZEit−1 + α5COLit−1 + it, (4)
where BCAP indicates the regulatory or the market capital ratio. The explanatory variables
are the bank’s Tobin’s q, or the bank charter value (BQ), the logarithmic value of the bank’s
asset volatility, or the bank’s total risk exposure (σ), proﬁtability (PROF), the logarithmic
value of total assets (SIZE) and collateral assets (COL). We include the bank’s Tobin’s q
and asset volatility deﬁned in the same manner as the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s q and asset volatility
(see Subsection 3.1). We deﬁne the proﬁtability as the return on asset in percentage terms
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and the collateral assets as 100 × (Liquid Assets + Tangible Assets)/Total Assets.17 The all
variables are lagged by one year. The regression also includes time and bank ﬁxed eﬀects
(year and ui) to control for unobserved heterogeneity across time and the bank level that
may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Table 10 reports summary statistics for
those variables.
In Subsection 4.3, when using the market capital ratio as a measure of bank balance
sheet risk, we found that banks with the lower market capital ratio were more severely
capital constrained in lending than those with the middle and higher capital ratio, although
all the Japanese banks faced a capital crunch. On the other hand, when using the regulatory
capital ratio, we demonstrated that only banks with the higher regulatory capital engaged
in forbearance lending. To incorporate these ﬁndings into our analysis of bank capital
structure, we also estimate equation (4) by additionally including ﬁve interaction terms
of the ﬁve explanatory variables and the lower market capital dummy in the regression
for the market capital ratio, and the interaction terms between each of the explanatory
variables and the higher regulatory capital dummy in the regression for the regulatory
capital ratio. Thus, we provide a detailed explanation for the reason that one would have
the two opposing evidence for troubled banks’ lending behavior.
The explanatory variables in equation (4) are conventional ones to explain the capi-
tal structure on the basis of the standard corporate ﬁnance theory emphasizing market
forces.18 According to this view, so-called the market view, the bank’s Tobin’s q is ex-
pected to have positive estimates since banks would protect a valuable charter by lowering
their leverage and thus by lowering default risk. Moreover, the bank proﬁt would also have
a positive coeﬃcient as higher proﬁts and sticky dividend allow to banks to accumulate
capital. The bank’s total risk exposure deﬁned as its asset volatility also should have a
positive estimate based on the inference that counterparties would claim more capital to
banks with more risk taking and more business uncertainly. On the other hand, there is
17 More concretely, we deﬁne Liquid Assets as Total Securities + Treasury Bills + Other Bills + Bonds +
CDs+Cash and Tangible Assets as Land and Buildings+Other Tangible Assets (see also Gropp and Heider
(2010)).
18 The corporate ﬁnance theory for the capital structure documents the role of dividend. However, we
do not include an indicator for dividend payers because all the banks pay dividends in our sample.
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no clear prediction on how the collateral and the size aﬀect capital building in terms of
the standard corporate ﬁnance theory. In contrast to the corporate ﬁnance view (or the
market view), one of alternative views puts emphasis on the impact of the capital regu-
lation. Hence, it predicts that the standard corporate ﬁnance determinants have little or
no explanatory power because the market forces are not main driving forces for banks to
build up their capital . The other alternative is the “buﬀer” view, where banks tend to
hold capital buﬀers above minimum regulatory requirement levels to avoid the costs that
arise from issuing equity on short notice. This buﬀer view predicts that banks with higher
proﬁts and higher Tobin’s q are likely to be more leveraged because such banks would face
less asymmetric information problems, and their costs associated with issuing equity are
relatively small.
Table 11 shows results for the regression of the market and the regulatory capital ratio.
In this table, we can observe that the two capital ratios provide quite diﬀerent results,
which well characterize capital building behavior by Japanese banks in the late 1990s.
More concretely, the standard corporate ﬁnance variables signiﬁcantly determine the market
capital ratio, while none of them determines the regulatory capital ratio. This means that
during the post-bubble period, or the pre-banking crisis period of the late 1990s, banks’
equity capital reﬂected normal market forces, but its regulatory capital did not at all. In
other words, in that period, neither the market view nor the buﬀer view is applied to the
regulatory capital ratio.
The signiﬁcantly positive estimate for the bank’s Tobin’s q (BQ) indicates that the
market capital ratio is associated with the bank’s charter value, or its future cash ﬂows,
while the regulatory capital ratio is not. Given that the sample mean of the regulatory
capital ratio continued to increase, but that of the market capital ratio continued to decrease
during the late 1990s, we can infer that Japanese banks were not able to maintain the
market capital to protect a valuable charter with the deteriorating Japanese economic
conditions while they were able to somehow increase the regulatory capital, irrespective of
the decreasing charter value.19 In other words, as the charter value decreases, banks tend
19 In the late 1990s, low banks’ proﬁts also contributed to the decrease in the market capital ratio.
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to become more leveraged (see Calomiris and Nissim (2014) for the US banks).20
The positive estimate of the bank’s total risk exposure (σ) suggests that Japanese banks
were substantially subject to the market forces: counterparties demanded more equity pro-
tection from a bank with greater portfolio risk (Flannery and Rangan (2008), Valencia
(2016), and Corbae et al. (2017)). However, banks facing higher business uncertainly were
not able to build up equity capital during the post-bubble period. Indeed, as shown in
Figure 5, the market capital ratio continued to decrease during Japan’s pre-banking crisis
period of the late 1990s, while the level of the bank’s asset volatility remained stable. By
contrast, the insigniﬁcant estimate of the regulatory capital ratio implies that a Japanese
bank built up regulatory book capital without being exposed to market forces. The esti-
mation results for the Tobin’s q and the risk exposure highlight the diﬀerence in the market
and regulatory capital ratios in terms of the market disciplines.
However, even in the regression of the market capital ratio, the Tobin’s q and the
bank’s total risk exposure have diﬀerent tendency for their estimation results, depending
on whether a bank enters into the lower market capital group or not. More concretely,
the interaction term of the Tobin’s q and the lower market capital dummy does not have
signiﬁcant estimates, whereas that of the bank’s risk exposure has signiﬁcantly negative
estimates, implying that the market capital ratio of the lower market capital banks less
reﬂect their portfolio risk. This is primarily because such banks were not able to issue
equity and increase market cap, even if they faced larger portfolio risk or tried to take
more risk.
Estimation results for the other explanatory variables in the market capital equation
are also quite consistent with the corporate ﬁnance theory and previous research on bank
capital structure (Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010)), but those in
the regulatory capital equation are not. Also note that such insensitivity of the regulatory
capital to the conventional explanatory variables are observed in all Japanese banks with
the lower, middle and higher levels of the regulatory capital.
We ﬁnd that the proﬁtability (PROF) has a signiﬁcantly positive estimate for the market
20 Calomiris and Nissim (2014) examined declines in the US bank’s Tobin’s q after the ﬁnancial crisis and
showed that the declines would reﬂect the erosion of future proﬁts.
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capital ratio as Tobin’s q does, indicating that banks tend to accumulate proﬁts to increase
the market capitalization (see Berger (1995)) with view to maintaining a valuable charter.
However, for banks with the lower market capital ratio, the proﬁtability less aﬀects the
market capital than for those with higher market capital. This patter is observed in the
estimates for the bank assets risk measure but not for the Tobin’s q. One of the possible
reasons for the heterogeneity in their impacts on the market capital is that banks with
lower market capital are more likely to face lower equity values and consequently they
have the diﬃculty of issuing equity in spite of high volatility in their assets. Thus, their
market capital turns to be less sensitive to their total risk exposure and proﬁts. Another
explanation for the heterogeneity in the impacts of proﬁts is that the “buﬀer” view start
to become eﬀective as banks’ market capital ratios decrease: i.e., banks with lower capital
make eﬀorts to ﬁnd a way to increase their capital as a buﬀer with their proﬁts decreasing,
which weaken the positive association with bank market capital.
The bank size (SIZE) and the collateral asset (COLL) have signiﬁcantly positive es-
timates for the regression of the market capital ratio, and the results do not depend on
its capital level since the interaction eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. The positive estimate for
the bank size imply that larger banks would hold more equity capital, but the regulatory
capital was built up irrespective of bank size. The positive estimate of the collateral asset
(COLL) in the market capital equation implies that the increase in banks’ collateral assets
would induce them to increase their market capitalization. This is probably because such
an increase in banks’ collateral assets is favored by market participants and thus larger
amounts of collateral maybe contribute to banks’ market capital.
Summing up our estimation results, the mechanism of determining the market and
the regulatory capital ratio is quite diﬀerent. The normal market forces measured by the
explanatory variables based on the standard corporate ﬁnance—the charter value, the un-
certainty, the proﬁtability, the bank size and the collateral asset—matter in diﬀerentiating
the mechanism of the two bank capital measures. The market capital ratio is substantially
subject to the normal market forces, but the regulatory capital ratio is not. Furthermore,
for banks with low market capital, their proﬁts and assets risk have less signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the market capital although the bank Tobin’s q has almost same magnitude of the eﬀect
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across banks with diﬀerent market capital levels. This result suggests that in the Japanese
late 1990s, although such banks struggled to increase market capital while facing a low
charter value, low proﬁts and high assets volatility, their market capital continued to de-
cline as their evaluation in the capital market deteriorated. On the other hand, Japanese
banks built the regulatory capital, utterly independently of the market forces. This is prob-
ably because as discussed in Subsection 2.1, the regulatory forbearance policy in Japan’s
post-bubble period allowed Japanese banks to engage in window dressing and patching up
of the regulatory (that is, book) capital by overvaluing assets.
5.3. The Real Wold of Japan’s Post-bubble Period By simultaneously controlling
for the market and regulatory capital ratios and the interaction of the two capital measures
in the bank loan equations, we demonstrated that the signiﬁcance of the regulatory capital
ratios vanishes, but the the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio survives. Moreover,
these results are robust even if we group Japanese banks into those with lower, middle and
higher levels of the market and the regulatory capital ratio and then run the subsample
regressions. These indicate that in reality, the Japanese distressed bank’s lending behavior
should be described as the stagnant lending in a capital crunch, but not as the forbearance
lending. In particular, banks with the lower level of the market capital ratio were more
severely subject to equity capital constraints in the capital crunch.
We also identiﬁed determinants of the market and regulatory capital of Japanese banks
and thereby examined why the two seemingly parallel worlds of the distressed banks’ lending
would emerge, depending on which of the two bank capital measures is used in the bank
loan equations. Surprisingly, all the standard corporate ﬁnance variables do not explain
Japanese banks’ regulatory capital, while they well explain their market capital. This
implies that Japanese banks engaged in patching up of their regulatory capital at their
discretion under the regulatory forbearance policy, utterly independently of the normal
market forces. On the the other hand, while banks engaged in window dressing of the
regulatory (or book) capital, the market capital ratio of Japanese banks was substantively
aﬀected by the normal market forces. That is, as banks can build up the regulatory capital
at their discretion, or there is a room for arbitrage in building up the regulatory capital,
the determinant of bank lending is the market capital, which is evaluated by equity market
28
participants and depositors, and thus is exposed to the normal market forces.
As discussed above, Japanese banks faced the capital crunch. In particular, banks in
the lower market capital group were more severely subject to equity capital constraints in
lending. We demonstrated that the market capital ratio of such banks was less sensitive to
their portfolio risk and proﬁtability. This ﬁnding implies that the stagnant bank lending
in a capital crunch would worsen in the situation where counterparts require more equity
protection from the lower market capital banks, but those banks are not able to build up
adequate capital relative to portfolio risk and proﬁtability. In the next section, we will
examine the relation between capital crunch and determinants of capital in more details.
6. A Key Driver of the Real World In this section, we estimate the bank loan model
by additionally controlling for the determinants of the market capital ratio—not only the
two corporate ﬁnance variables, but also the other three variables—in order to ﬁnd a key
driver of a capital crunch.
6.1. Controlling for Determinants of Market Capital Ratios Here, we report
estimation results for the bank loan equation including not only the market capital ratio,
but also the ﬁve explanatory variables, each included in the regression of the market capital
ratio (see Subsection 5.2). The purpose of this test is to explore a key driver of a capital
crunch by examining which of the ﬁve determinants of the market capital ratio eliminates
the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio.21 If one of the determinants supersedes the
market capital ratio, it is a key driver of a capital crunch. Table 12 reports estimation
results obtained by additionally including the ﬁve determinants of the market capital ratio.
We can observe that only the bank’s portfolio risk, or the bank’s total risk exposure,
eliminates the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio and it has a signiﬁcantly positive
estimate. Note that not only the portfolio risk, but also the proﬁtability has less explanatory
power for the market capital ratio of lowly market capitalized banks (see Subsection 4.3).
However, the proﬁtability appearers not to supersede the market capital ratio in the bank
21 We do not include the interaction term of the market capital ratio and the ﬁrm performance variable—
the borrower’s Tobin’q and the distance to default—since the interaction eﬀect was not signiﬁcant in a
statistically robust manner, as demonstrated in Section 4.
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loan equation. This indicates that the diﬃculty of increasing capital due to high asset risks,
rather than low proﬁtability, is a main factor that caused a capital crunch.
7. Conclusion We provide three substantive conclusions. First, the misperception of
bank balance sheet risk would lead to the misunderstanding of distressed banks’ lending
behavior by generating a “parallel world.” This problem of misunderstanding exacerbates
when a proxy for bank balance sheet risk has no information on the bank balance sheet
risk, as in the Japanese economy in the late 1990s. The use of the regulatory capital, which
reﬂect neither bank balance sheet risk nor normal market forces, provides the evidence
supporting the forbearance lending in which lowly capitalized banks allocated more credits
to low-quality borrowers, as demonstrated by Peek and Rosengren (2005). On the other
hand, the use of the market value of bank capital, which correctly reﬂects bank balance
sheet risk and normal market forces, provides the evidence supporting the existence of a
capital crunch in which lowly capitalized banks decreased credits to all borrowers even if
they were good borrowers, as demonstrated by Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007). These
results are robust even if we employ the same type of nonlinear speciﬁcation of Peek and
Rosengren (2005) and if we use each bank’s lending exposure to real estates in the bubble
period in stead of the market capital measure, as in Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007).
Second, we ﬁnd that the “real world” of distressed banks’ lending behavior should be
elucidated in terms of whether a proxy of bank balance sheet risk correctly reﬂect normal
market forces emphasized in the literature of the capital structure: creditors demand more
equity from banks with greater uncertainty to secure a valuable charter. By simultaneously
controlling for the regulatory and market capital ratio, and the interaction of them in the
bank loan equation, we demonstrated that only the coeﬃcient of thev market capital ratio,
which is determined by the normal market forces, remained signiﬁcant in a robust manner.
This indicates that distressed Japanese banks’ lending behavior should be characterized as
the stagnant lending in a capital crunch, but not the forbearance lending.
Lastly, banks facing lower market capital levels and more severe equity capital con-
straints in lending are less sensitive to the normal market forces because such lowly cap-
italized banks are more diﬃcult to maintain enough equity capital relative to their total
risk exposure and business uncertainty. In other words, a capital crunch would attributable
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to uncertainty faced by lowly capitalized banks and their diﬃculty of building up equity
capital.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the “parallel worlds,” or the two opposing views on lending
behavior of troubled banks, emerge as the regulatory capital does not reﬂect the actual
condition of increased risk on bank balance sheet, while the market capital does. In Japan’s
post-bubble period, banks with lower market capital levels decreased the supply of credits,
engaging in patching up of the regulatory capital (i.e. book capital) under the regulatory
forbearance policy. Such a capital crunch and regulatory arbitrage can occur simultaneously
whenever a bank is allowed to overvalue its portfolios and capital with its partial discretion,
though it shows up in the Japan’s post-bubble (pre-banking crisis) period as one of the
most typical cases (see also e.g., Haldane and Madouros (2012) and Sarin and Summers
(2016) for the US case).
In the stagnant lending due to a capital crunch, distressed banks with impaired capital
decrease credits whether their borrowing ﬁrms are low-quality or not. To the contrary, in
the forbearance lending, such distressed banks do not decrease credits, but allocate more
credits from good borrowers to bad borrowers. In other words, the forbearance lending
has a certain aspect of the risk taking by the distressed banks on the future revival of
low-quality borrowers (see Fukuda and Nakamura (2008)), but in the stagnant lending in a
capital crunch, distressed banks are involved in the process of credit contraction not only
for bad borrowers, but also for good borrowers. From this viewpoint, a capital crunch is in
a more urgent situation for policy makers, where restoring banks’ impaired capitals would
bring about substantial improvements to economy. If one uses the regulatory capital in
specifying the bank loan equation in spite of its weak tie with the bank balance sheet risk,
it would lead policy makers to conduct a wrong policy based on the misunderstanding of
distressed banks’ lending behavior. In other words, our results suggest that it is important
to consider the policy design so that banks are required to build up capital based on a
substantive measure, but not spurious one.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for bank loan equations
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variables
growth rate of loans (LOANjit) 120561 -2.146 27.594 -99.852 100
loan dummy 120561 .247 .431 0 1
Bank capital variables (BCAPit 1)
market capital ratio 119384 6.434 3.315 .602 15.723
regulatory capital ratio 120561 1.503 1.111 -5.01 9.48
lending exposure to real estate 120534 9.285 3.79 2.865 30.667
Firm performance variables (FIRMjt 1)
Tobin's q (FQjt 1) 118643 126.399 37.563 41.436 892.367
distance to default (FDDjt 1) 118643 4.189 2.623 .625 134.772
Relationship variables
lending exposure 120561 .034 .093 0 1.987
borrowing exposure 120561 8.803 158.361 0 44065.18
Notes: Estimation samples are from March 1994 to March 1999. Lagged variables, or
all explanatory variables, are from March 1993 to March 1998. We exclude the upper
ve percentiles of the growth rate of loans outstanding as the extreme values. The loan
dummy is dened as one if LOAN is positive, zero otherwise.
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Table 3: Further results on estimating bank loan equations
(A) Nonlinear specication
regulatory capital market capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BCAP -0.00655 -0.0189*** 0.0362*** 0.0197***
(0.0110) (0.00577) (0.00318) (0.00194)
BCAP  FQ -0.0000408 -0.000142***
(0.0000868) (0.0000224)
BCAP  FDD 0.00206* -0.000415
(0.00112) (0.000328)
lending exposure 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.510*** 0.511***
(0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0572) (0.0571)
borrowing exposure 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0148*** 0.0147***
(0.000446) (0.000446) (0.000451) (0.000451)
rm x. e. yes yes yes yes
Obs. 124030 124030 122832 122832
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote sig-
nicance levels at 0:10, 0:05, and 0:01, respectively. BCAP denotes a regulatory
capital ratio of a lending bank on the columns (1) and (2), while it denotes a mar-
ket capital ratio on the columns (3) and (4). FQ and FDD denote a Tobin's q and
a measure of distance to default of a borrowing rm, respectively. The dependent
variable is replaced by a indicator variable which takes one if LOAN is positive,
zero otherwise. We regress the probit model with borrowing rm's random eects
like a model of Peek and Rosengren (2005). The nonlinear specication also in-
cludes dummy variables for representing each year. However, their results do not
be reported due to limitations on the space.
(B) Use of a lending exposure to real estate as a bank capital variable
lending exposure
(5) (6) (7) (8)
BCAP -0.537*** -0.399***
(0.0656) (0.0360)
BCAP  FQ 0.000688 -0.000181
(0.000498) (0.000567)
BCAP  FDD -0.0127 -0.00875
(0.00776) (0.00949)
lending exposure 4.954*** 6.256*** 4.916*** 6.248***
(0.933) (0.887) (0.933) (0.886)
borrowing exposure 0.0438*** 0.0192** 0.0438*** 0.0191**
(0.00824) (0.00933) (0.00824) (0.00933)
rm-year x. e. yes yes yes yes
bank-year x. e. yes yes
Obs. 118619 118619 118619 118619
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote signif-
icance levels at 0:10, 0:05, and 0:01, respectively. BCAP denotes a bank lending
exposure to real estate in 1989 instead of the two bank capital measure like Gan
(2007) and Watanabe (2007). FQ and FDD denote a Tobin's q and a measure of
distance to default of a borrowing rm, respectively. We cannot include bank xed
eects since the lending exposure is time invariant.
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Table 6: Results on estimating bank loan equations with the simultaneous control (FQ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REGCAP -0.541* -0.404
(0.283) (0.491)
REGCAP  FQ 0.00673*** 0.00502** 0.00812** 0.00155
(0.00224) (0.00229) (0.00390) (0.00402)
MARCAP 0.384*** 0.425**
(0.111) (0.175)
MARCAP  FQ -0.00128** 0.000531 -0.000970 -0.000529
(0.000643) (0.000650) (0.00120) (0.00123)
REGCAP  MARCAP -0.0486
(0.0881)
REGCAP  MARCAP  FQ -0.000219 0.000697
(0.000666) (0.000699)
lending exposure 6.790*** 6.895*** 6.773*** 6.899***
(0.893) (0.902) (0.893) (0.902)
borrowing exposure 0.0217** 0.0183** 0.0218** 0.0184**
(0.00933) (0.00934) (0.00934) (0.00934)
rm-year x. e. yes yes yes yes
bank x. e. yes yes
bank-year x. e. yes yes
Obs. 117494 117494 117494 117494
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote signi-
cance levels at 0:10, 0:05, and 0:01, respectively. REGCAP and MARCAP denote
a regulatory capital ratio and a market capital ratio of a lending bank, respectively.
FQ denotes a Tobin's q of a borrowing rm.
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Table 7: Results on estimating bank loan equations with the simultaneous control (FDD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REGCAP 0.0745 0.317
(0.144) (0.258)
REGCAP  FDD 0.0474* -0.0109 0.0589 -0.0505
(0.0286) (0.0304) (0.0531) (0.0656)
MARCAP 0.260*** 0.327***
(0.0783) (0.0980)
MARCAP  FDD -0.0149* -0.0124 -0.0129 -0.0255*
(0.00867) (0.00913) (0.0137) (0.0148)
REGCAP  MARCAP -0.0643
(0.0427)
REGCAP  MARCAP  FDD -0.00178 0.00739
(0.00656) (0.00833)
lending exposure 6.773*** 6.919*** 6.757*** 6.926***
(0.892) (0.902) (0.892) (0.902)
borrowing exposure 0.0216** 0.0183* 0.0218** 0.0182*
(0.00933) (0.00934) (0.00933) (0.00934)
Obs. 117494 117494 117494 117494
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote sig-
nicance levels at 0:10, 0:05, and 0:01, respectively. REGCAP and MARCAP
denote a regulatory capital ratio and a market capital ratio of a lending bank,
respectively. FDD denotes a measure of distance to default of a borrowing
rm.
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Table 10: Summary statistics for bank capital equations
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
market capital ratio 710 5.359 2.273 .602 15.723
regulatory capital ratio 824 1.388 1.391 -5.01 9.48
bank charter value (BQit 1) 704 102.24 2.136 98.272 114.997
protability (PROFit 1) 824 .066 .298 -2.61 .598
log(total asset) (SIZEit 1) 824 14.727 1.365 12.303 18.171
collateral assets (COLit 1) 824 23.409 5.943 11.596 44.308
log(asset volatility) (it 1) 704 .225 .697 -4.531 2.62
Notes: Estimation samples are from March 1993 to March 1998. Lagged
variables, or all explanatory variables, are from March 1992 to March 1997.
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Table 11: Estimation results on determinants of the two bank capital ratio
(A) market capital (B) regulatory capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BQ 0.259*** 0.226*** BQ 0.0695 0.0703
(0.0431) (0.0523) (0.0447) (0.0427)
PROF 0.315** 1.200*** PROF 0.325 0.0635
(0.145) (0.300) (0.242) (0.160)
SIZE 1.997** 1.931** SIZE 1.003 1.105
(0.959) (0.957) (1.204) (1.065)
COL 0.0813*** 0.0799*** COL 0.0151 0.0127
(0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0231) (0.0235)
 0.204** 0.419**  0.0675 0.0809
(0.0959) (0.161) (0.0847) (0.0863)
DMlow BQ 0.0811 DRhigh BQ -0.0840
(0.0944) (0.0799)
DMlow PROF -1.145*** DRhigh PROF 1.031***
(0.315) (0.357)
DMlow SIZE -0.0606 DRhigh SIZE -0.0526
(0.165) (0.164)
DMlow COL -0.0264 DRhigh COL 0.00190
(0.0218) (0.0237)
DMlow   -0.244* DRhigh   0.0795
(0.141) (0.241)
DMlow -6.604 D
R
high 9.212
(9.783) (8.682)
constant -52.88*** -48.60*** constant -21.54 -23.04
(15.94) (17.28) (19.36) (17.40)
Obs. 701 701 Obs. 704 704
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote
signicance levels at 0:10, 0:05, and 0:01, respectively. The dependent variable
is the market capital ratio in the panel (A), while it is the regulatory capital
ratio in the panel (B). DMlow denotes a dummy variable which takes one if a bank
is classied into a low market capital ratio, zero otherwise. DMhigh denotes a
dummy variable which takes one if a bank is classied into a high regulatory
capital ratio, zero otherwise. Estimating equations also include dummy variables
for representing each year. However, their results do not be reported due to
limitations on the space.
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Table 12: Results on estimating bank loan equations including the determinantes of the market
capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MARCAP 0.234*** 1.388*** 0.204*** 0.319*** 0.260*** 0.00480
(0.0675) (0.245) (0.0684) (0.0677) (0.0726) (0.0728)
BQ -1.058***
(0.215)
PROF 0.563**
(0.246)
SIZE 12.72***
(1.072)
COL -0.0296
(0.0326)
 3.018***
(0.364)
lending exposure 7.260*** 7.292*** 7.267*** 7.332*** 7.263*** 7.261***
(0.879) (0.878) (0.878) (0.881) (0.879) (0.878)
borrowing exposure 0.0000306 0.0000250 0.0000238 0.0000996 0.0000270 0.0000338
(0.0000881) (0.0000898) (0.0000888) (0.0000940) (0.0000876) (0.0000889)
rm-year x. e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
bank x. e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 119384 119384 119384 119384 119384 119384
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote signicance levels at 0:10, 0:05,
and 0:01, respectively. The dependent variable is LOAN, which indicates a growth rate of a total amount of
loans outstanding.
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Figure 1: Means of bank market capital ratio and regulatory capital surplus
Notes: The solid line represents means of the bank market capital ratio at each year, and the dashed line represents
means of the bank regulatory capital surplus at each year.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of between the two bank capital ratio
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of between lending exposure of real estates and the bank capital ratio
Notes: The left panel is a scatter plot of between the lending exposure of real estates and the regulatory capital
surplus, and the right panel is that of between the lending exposure of real estates and the market capital ratio.
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(B) Market capital
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Figure 4: Average supply eects of bank capital on lending
Notes: Dots represent point estimates of average marginal eects of bank capital measure, BCAP, at a representative
value of the rm performance variables in the bank loan equations reported on Table 2. Capped vertical lines represent
their condence intervals with 95 percent signicance level calculated by the delta method. Shadow areas represent
histograms of the rm performance variables correspond to the right axes.
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Figure 5: Means of bank market capital ratio and the asset volatility
Notes: The solid line represents means of the bank market capital ratio at each year, it is the same as Figure 1, and
the dashed line represents means of the logarithmic value of the bank's asset volatility at each year.
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